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Abstract 
This paper investigates causalities between small businesses and the shadow economy 
in ten New Member States of the European Union in the years 2000–2005. The transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy, with deregulation and privatization of eco-
nomic activities, has yielded new opportunities for small businesses, new entrepreneurial 
ideas, and new income sources in these countries. Yet, rigid legislation, high tax wedges, 
and transaction costs of government institutions have increased the incentives for people 
to take their work into the shadow economy. To account for the simultaneity and latent 
variable effects we apply the instrumental variables econometric approach to study the as-
sociation between small business and the shadow economy. We find that these variables 
are (weakly) negatively correlated, implying that the macroeconomic environment and in-
stitutional framework have improved, encouraging entrepreneurial activities while some-
what impeding the further development of the shadow economy. 
1. Introduction 
The  small  business  economy  has  a significant  role  in  the rapidly  changing 
contemporary world. Its flexibility has been the main driving force behind the rising 
share of small businesses in profit making, job creation, innovation activities, econo-
mic growth, and other economic and social indicators of the economy. Nevertheless, 
small business is disproportionately vulnerable to tight regulation, high taxation, bu-
reaucratic burdens, and even corruption (e.g. (Aidis, 2003), (Bartlet et al., 2005), 
(Borozan et al., 2005)). It is thus believed to be prone to leaking into the shadow 
economy. On the other hand, the increased internationalization of the economy and 
increasing competitive market pressures have promoted flexibility and innovative-
ness, but – along with the growth in small business – have deepened income inequa-
lities. In such harsher competitive global circumstances, people have been forced to 
seek alternative sources of income. This has further encouraged and increased small 
business activities, but at the same time many of the new businesses have been 
started up in the shadow economy. High taxes and high bureaucratic transaction costs 
have increased this shift into the shadow economy.  
European Commission (2004) and OECD (2002) underline a direct causality 
between small businesses, as proxied by the number of self-employed persons, and 
the shadow economy. It is assumed that small businesses, being flexible and easier to 
conceal from the authorities, have more scope to work undetected in the shadow eco-
nomy. Furthermore, higher taxes and other regulations increase the incentives to hide 
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(e.g. (Johnson et al., 1999)). Although this connection is reasonable, not all of the cor-
relation between small business and the shadow economy can be attributed to this 
direct effect alone. The tax wedge, labor-market regulation, administrative transac-
tion costs, the investment climate, income inequality, and some other variables affect 
(with different signs and intensity) both small business and the shadow  economy 
(Djankov et al., 2001), (OECD, 2002), (Schneider, Enste, 2002), (Mesnard, Raval-
lion, 2003), (Aidis, 2003), (Bartlett et al., 2005). Finding the true connection between 
the quantities and variables studied, namely, small business and the shadow economy, 
is of great importance, since small business is a desired quantity, as it brings along eco-
nomic growth and development.
1 On the other hand, the shadow economy is some-
thing most governments fight against, as it entails violation of government rules. 
Thus, this quantity should be minimized. 
Therefore, the main focus and rationale for this paper lies in the expected con-
nection between small business and the shadow economy. More specifically, this 
paper contributes to the existing literature in three significant directions. Firstly, this 
is  the first  study  to  investigate  the causality  between  the emerging  small  business 
sector and the shadow economy for the ten New Member States of the European 
Union (NMS-10).
2 The NMS-10, as former transition countries, have significant dy-
namics in small business development and in the persistence of the shadow economy 
as well (e.g. (Schneider, 2007)). Secondly, we analyze the latent connection and si-
multaneity using the instrumental-variables (two-stage least square) approach to de-
termine the association and effect of small business on the shadow economy. We 
strive to show that in order to diminish the negative consequences of the shadow eco-
nomy, which distorts the grounds for proper income and social policies, one needs to 
take into account the effects of measures that affect entrepreneurial spirit in the eco-
nomy as well. We empirically and econometrically study the years from 2000 to 
2005. Thirdly, we derive policy implications and guidelines for proper policy tools on 
the trade-off between policies encouraging small business and entrepreneurship on 
the one hand, and discouraging the shadow economy on the other.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section deals with the as-
sociation  between  the shadow  economy  and  small  business  development,  outlining 
terms and determinants for their functioning. The subsequent sections explain the data 
and methodologies used and present the empirical results obtained. The final section 
concludes.  
2. The Shadow Economy and Small Business 
2.1 The Shadow Economy 
The shadow economy is generally a well known phenomenon. It is present all 
over the globe and has been so for a long time (e.g. (Nastav, Bojnec, 2007)). Never-
1 It is a worth of mentioning that economic or productivity growth is the standard objective of most eco-
nomic policies (e.g. (Deliktaú, Balcilar, 2005, p. 7). 
2 The NMS-10 includes the group of the eight former communist countries that entered into the EU on
1st May 2004: three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and five Central European countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Yet, the two remaining NMS-10 are Bul-
garia and Romania that entered into the EU on 1st January 2007. Cyprus and Malta that also entered
the EU in 2004 are excluded from the analysis. The reason for that is that Malta and Cyprus differ from
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theless,  a detailed  analysis  of  the phenomenon  reveals  that  the related  definitions, 
terminology, and methodology are far from being unified. For instance, the defini-
tions focus on all productive activities whose goods and services are legal, but which 
are themselves deliberately concealed from the authorities, usually to make financial 
gains (e.g. tax avoidance or non-compliance with regulations and standards). How-
ever, illegal activities (smuggling, drug dealing and the like) are occasionally includ-
ed. Furthermore, terms such as the shadow, underground, hidden or grey economy, 
the informal sector, and undeclared or illicit work are used, but not always consis-
tently and correctly. Measuring the shadow economy also poses a challenge to re-
searchers, primarily due to its nature: by definition the shadow economy is concealed 
and therefore it is often impossible to measure its size directly. Moreover, several me-
thods have been developed to quantify the size of the shadow economy. In general, 
three main groups can be identified: (1) direct methods, comprising surveys of the sha-
dow-economy behavior of households and enterprises; (2) indirect methods, quan-
tifying the shadow economy through the marks it leaves on the (official) economy; 
and  (3) modeling,  investigating  the causes (determinants)  and  reflecting  indicators 
through the latent shadow economy variable, which is then estimated. 
The phenomenon of the shadow economy has both negative and positive sides. 
The shadow  economy  causes  the revenue authorities  to collect  less  in  taxes,  may 
cause damage to official-economy firms, as they face higher costs (and are thus less 
competitive), and may also make consumers worse off, as they have no warranty for 
the products and services they purchase in the shadow economy. On the other hand, 
the shadow economy has positive consequences as well. Firms engaged in the sha-
dow economy can operate at lower (labor) costs and more people can be employed. 
Consumers pay less, since no value-added tax is charged, and they do not face some 
of the operational and transaction costs caused by bureaucratic and administrative 
barriers, which demand additional resources. This latter implicit taxation can also in-
crease the entrepreneurial incentive in the shadow economy. The shadow economy 
can than serve as an incubator for emerging small enterprises, which, once they are 
successfully “on the road”, turn legal. It is a formidable task to determine which, po-
sitive or negative, consequences of the shadow economy prevail. Therefore, several 
studies have been conducted across countries and over time to gain more information 
on the phenomenon and its causes and consequences (e.g. (Schneider, Enste, 2002), 
(OECD, 2002), (Schneider, 2007), (Smith, 2002). Determining the share of the sha-
dow economy in gross domestic product (GDP) is essential for obtaining the true 
state of the economy. Only in this way can different policies be evaluated and proper 
tools be developed.  
Special research and policy interest has been devoted in the past decade(s) to 
the transition (emerging market) economies, which mainly comprise ex-communist 
Central and Eastern European countries and countries of the former Soviet Union. As 
these countries have some common shadow economy features, they have normally 
been studied and analyzed jointly. For instance, Árvay (1993), Feige and Ott (1999), 
European Commission (2004), Feige and Urban (2005), Nastav and Bojnec (2007), 
Schneider (2007), and many others apply various methodologies and provide an in-
sight into shadow economy activities in transition countries. They, as well as other 
studies (e.g. (Johnson et al., 1999), (Schneider, Enste, 2002), (OECD, 2002), (Choi, 
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and non-existent or deficient rule of law as the main causes of the existence and de-
velopment of the shadow economy.  
Different studies have produced various estimates of the size of the shadow 
economy in the NMS-10. Thus, for proper comparison a common methodological ap-
proach needs to be considered. One such attempt is from Schneider (2004), presented 
in Table  1, with a data update used in the econometric part for the period 2000– 
–2005.
3 At first glance, the results on the size of the shadow economy are surprising 
in their magnitude and trend. The latter in particular is of relatively very low inten-
sity. One would expect the size of the shadow economy to have reduced in the end- 
-of-transition period. We can see that the size of the shadow economy in the countries 
studied ranges from around 18 to 40 percent of official GDP, but over the analyzed 
years it has increased slightly further. The shadow economy varies considerably across 
the NMS-10 countries. This suggests that the emergence of small businesses and the oc-
currence of entrepreneurial activities could have a significant effect on these changes. 
However, one needs to bear in mind that different methodologies lead to dif-
ferent shadow economy estimates, and none of them is error-free. Thus, there are no 
means of saying which is the best methodology for measuring the shadow economy, 
as all of them build on certain assumptions. However, when conducting an interna-
tional comparison or a comparison over time, the only way to limit this problem is to 
be consistent by using a common approach in each of the studied cases. By doing 
this, the question of the methodology becomes less relevant and we are left to deal 
with the other issues to be studied. We follow this line of thought by using Schnei-
der’s (2007) latent-variable and currency-demand-method estimates of the shadow 
economy in the countries studied and in the time frame analyzed.  
2.2 Small Business 
The term small business in general applies to firms with a limited number of 
employees, e.g. up to 40 employees (European Commission 2003). Occasionally, me-
3 We extend gratitude for the data on the shadow economy, that prof. Schneider has provided (Schneider
2007). 
TABLE 1  The Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of Official GDP) in the Ten New Member 
States of the European Union Using the Latent Variable and Currency-Demand 
Methods
Shadow Economy (in % of official GDP) 
Country 
1999/2000  2001/2002  2002/2003 
Bulgaria  36.9  37.1  38.3 
Czech Republic  19.1  19.6  20.1 
Estonia  38.4  39.2  40.1 
Hungary  25.1  25.7  26.2 
Latvia  39.9  40.7  41.3 
Lithuania  30.3  31.4  32.6 
Poland  27.6  28.2  28.9 
Romania  34.4  36.1  37.4 
Slovak Republic  18.9  19.3  20.2 
Slovenia  27.1  28.3  29.4 
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dium-sized enterprises are combined with small businesses to form the category of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Several measurements and variables 
have been developed to study and explain the performance of small business. Small 
business is normally approximated by a natural quantity, i.e., the number (or share) of 
self-employed persons in the economy (see (Aidis, 2003), (Bartelsman et al., 2004), 
(Borozan et al., 2005), (Kosi, Bojnec, 2006a)). We have used the share of the self-em-
ployed in total employment as the proxy for small business. 
Small business is believed to be one of the main engines of the contemporary 
economy,  being  the embodiment  of  entrepreneurship,  which  promotes  innovation, 
development,  economic  growth,  income  generation  and  distribution,  and e m p l o y -
ment.
4 Small business has found its way around in the transition period, being fle-
xible  and  competitive  and  able  to  provide  the needed  supply. These  activities  on 
the one hand have increased the welfare of the people and on the other hand have 
provided  the assets  needed  for  research  and  development  and  thus  for  economic 
growth (e.g. (Djankov et al., 2001), (Aidis, 2003), (Bartelsman et al., 2004), (Bo-
rozan et al., 2005), (Grilo, Thurik, 2006), (Kosi, Bojnec, 2006b), (Žakelj, 2006)). 
Figure 1 reveals the correlations for the studied variables across the NMS-10 
countries in the years 2000–2005. Supplementing Figure 1 with the correlation co-
efficient of -0.66, this proves the association between the studied variables to be ne-
gative, yet of very low intensity. So although the association is of negative sign, less 
robust conclusions can be drawn from it. 
There are several factors that affect small business and/or economic growth 
and the performance of the economy. In particular, the functioning of the financial mar-
ket is seen as an important determinant of (long-term) economic growth in the emer-
ging NMS-10 markets.
5 At the same time, small business is still often seen as a small 
4 Bartlett et al. (2005, p. 1435) argue that the SME development is now widely seen as a key element in
the transition to a market economy in the emerging market economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
5 Darrat et al. (2006, p. 10) explain some other factors than financial development influencing economic
growth in the emerging markets. 
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firm, which, besides offering flexibility, also has a limited fund-raising capability and, 
even more importantly, means that inappropriate policies can put a disproportionate 
burden on this “sector”. The various constraints include high transaction costs relating 
to bureaucracy and time-consuming paperwork. This increases the costs of business 
activities. Furthermore, corruption, high taxes, weak financial-market conditions for in-
novative business ideas, high(er) risks, and weak rule of law all increase operational 
costs, limit the accessibility of financial resources, and deny security of intellectual 
property. This implicit business taxation reduces the power of the small business en-
gine, thus seriously hampering its development and setting up incentives for a shift into 
the shadow economy. Therefore, the entry and growth of small businesses has encou-
raged a stable micro- and macro-environment for entrepreneurial and innovative pro-
jects, with various implications for employment and economic growth. 
2.3 Causalities and Variables 
We study the association between the two variables, namely, small business 
and the shadow economy. The causalities between them can be simultaneous in both 
directions and hence we have to deal with the identification problem regarding the de-
pendent and independent variable as well as regarding the sign of the association. 
Taking a brief look at their correlation in Figure 2, we can see that this causality is 
far from being clearly positive or clearly negative. The correlation coefficient is 
0.114, but statistically not significant. This finding provides only a limited and incon-
clusive amount of information, making statements on causalities inappropriate. How-
ever, our focus is to explain how small business, as the explanatory variable, causes 
changes in the shadow economy, as the dependent variable. 
The factors affecting the shadow economy and small business are linked into 
a model to study this relation. The main causes of the shadow economy are weak macro-
economic stability, high income inequality, and especially a high tax burden, bu-
reaucracy and rigid administration, as well as a lack of transparency and rule of  
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law, accompanied by corruption (e.g. (Feige, Ott, 1999), (Schneider, Enste, 2002), 
(OECD, 2002)). Studies of the shadow economy have further indicated that small 
business is more likely to foster shadow economy activities (Johnson et al., 1999), 
(Feige, Ott, 1999), (European Commission, 2004), (OECD, 2002). This correlation 
causality holds especially for the ex-communist emerging market economies, where 
the majority of production in the past took place in state-owned and governed com-
panies. During the transition toward a market economy in the early 1990s these huge 
state companies were restructured and broken up. This made room for the (legal) 
evolution and development of small businesses. With the legislation and adminis-
tration unable to adapt to the new market environment and demand in such a short 
time frame, the small business sector offered a way of overcoming these obstacles 
and for supply to meet demand via shadow economy activities. This line of thought is 
partially supported by the data evidence, as the shadow economy as a percentage of 
official GDP increased in the transition period (e.g. (Schneider, 2002, 2004, 2007)). It 
has  therefore  been  recognized  that  many  entrepreneurial  ideas  start  in  small  bu-
sinesses in the shadow economy, especially when high tax and regulatory burdens 
hinder the development of the (legal) small business sector (Johnson et al., 1999), 
(Feige, Ott, 1999), (OECD, 2002), (European Commission, 2004), (Schneider, 2007). 
Although the transition period leads to greater demand for flexibility and competi-
tiveness, the legislative and tax systems may, at least in the initial phase, discourage 
official small business, but give room for shadow economy activities. Thus, with 
a higher share of small businesses, there is also the possibility of a higher share of 
the shadow economy. However, as the country becomes more developed, the obsta-
cles to the development of entrepreneurial activities fall and small businesses should 
start to flow into the official economy and away from the shadow economy. The sha-
dow economy should also diminish with economic development (Schneider, Enste, 
2002).  
3. Methodology and Data Used 
The effect of small business on the shadow economy can be represented in 
a simplistic way by the following equation: 
      1 _ SE S EMPL DE               (1) 
where the dependent variable SE stands for the size of the shadow economy as a per-
centage of GDP, calculated using the Multiple-Indicators-Multiple-Causes (MIMIC) 
approach of Schneider (2002, 2004, 2007), and the explanatory variable S_EMPL
stands for the share of the self-employed in total employment as a measure of small 
business. This is the latent variable of entrepreneurship, which cannot be measured 
directly. The association between small business and the shadow economy can go in 
both directions (ILO, 2002), (OECD, 2002), (European Commission, 2004), (Wil-
liams, 2004). On the other hand, the higher the share of the shadow economy in 
the economy,  the more  individuals  turn  to  private  activities,  i.e.,  small  business, 
encouraged by the merits of shadow economy activities (lower costs, taxes and so 
on) and the prospects they offer for small business development and success. 
However, the association between the shadow economy and small business is 
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stability, social security, institutional transparency, and efficiency. Thus, the initial 
model, represented solely by equation (1), is less likely to be of realistic value. One 
could argue that several of the factors affect both studied variables, but not neces-
sarily equally in strength and size. Therefore, in order to determine the (clear) effect 
of small business on the shadow economy, we have to bring other (control) variables 
into our multivariate regression framework. These include, based on previous studies 
(e.g. (Feige, Ott, 1999), (Schneider, 2004)), explanatory variables covering macro-
economic stability (such as GDP figures, unemployment rates, and inflation rates), 
which  on  the one hand  improve  the entrepreneurial  environment  and  on  the other 
hand affect the shadow economy. Other explanatory variables represent social condi-
tions in the country, such as the measure of income inequality, the social  security 
network  and  suchlike,  as  these  can  increase  the shift  into  the shadow  economy 
through the search for new jobs. At the same time, a more unstable social position 
can force more people to seek additional income sources in private business due to 
the inefficient functioning of state authorities and a lack of institutional transparency 
and efficiency, and also due to bureaucracy and tax burdens. The latter group of fac-
tors hinders the development of small business and at the same time can increase 
the shift from the official to the shadow economy and vice versa. Such a model 
would be better described by equation (2), which is more likely to realistically con-
tribute to the evaluation of the effect of small business on the shadow economy: 
12 3 4 5 6
78
_ _. . .
... _
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(2) 
where gross domestic product (GDP), rates of inflation (INFL), and unemployment 
(UNEMPL) are included as the control variables of macroeconomic stability. Unequal 
income distribution, as the measure of income inequality, is measured by the Gini co-
efficient of concentration (GINI), with higher values indicating higher inequality of 
income distribution. Economic freedom is a domain for the tax burden, where we 
have chosen total taxes on capital (T_C) and total taxes on labor (T_L), which are be-
lieved to negatively affect S_EMPL. TI is the Transparency International corruption 
perception index, with higher values indicating lower corruption in the country.  
However, due to the mixed and simultaneous effects of these control variables 
on both the small business and shadow economy variables, this simple functional fra-
mework is (still) not appropriate. The direct effect of small business on the shadow 
economy, i.e. limiting the negative effects of the shadow economy, is likely to be 
blurred by simultaneity and at the same time by the latent effects of other factors. 
This point, however, is important for proper policy modeling, since small business 
development is desirable, whereas the shadow economy is not. So interaction be-
tween small business development and shadow economy should be determined ac-
curately.  
We  follow  the hypothesis  that  the development  of  small  business d o e s  ne-
cessarily affect the shadow economy. Yet, due to the presence of simultaneity and 
the latent  variable,  there  is  an identification  problem  as  regards  the directions  of 
the causalities. This may cause the model presented so far to have false implications. 
To avoid possible methodological faults as regards measuring the connection between 
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variables on each other and on the other variables included needs to be taken into 
account. To be even more accurate, if we wish to determine the correlation between 
small business and the shadow economy, we have to make adjustments to our model. 
This is because the small business variable we use is only a proxy for the latent va-
riable of entrepreneurship. One way to deal with these issues is to apply the instru-
mental variables (IV) approach, since the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach in 
such a situation would yield a biased and inconsistent estimator (e.g. (Greene, 2003)). 
The IV approach is widely used to estimate systems of simultaneous equations and to 
counteract bias from measurement errors (Angrist, Krueger, 2001, p. 72). The same 
variables that have effects on the shadow economy also have effects on small bu-
siness. And at the same time, small business affects the shadow economy. Essen-
tially, the procedure for overcoming (part of) these problems is to eliminate the effect 
of variables affecting both the shadow economy and small business from the small 
business variable as described in equation (1). Yet, as has been explained, the use of 
equation (2) is also not desirable. In order to account for the methodological pro-
blems mentioned above, we apply the IV approach to equation (2). In this way we 
obtain equation (3). But first, we need to identify the right instruments.  
Selecting the right instruments is of great importance in this procedure. Va-
rious econometrics papers and textbooks (e.g. (McFadden, 1999), (Bårdsen, et al., 
2005), (Cameron, Trivedi, 2005)) stress their importance, as bad instruments produce 
unreliable results. Thus, the instrumental variables have to be selected in such a man-
ner as to have a zero or very low correlation with the error term from the equation of 
interest, and on the other hand to be highly correlated with the other explanatory 
variables in the initial equation (in our case, equation (2)). Following, for instance, 
McFadden (1999), the instruments should include all of the explanatory variables (X)
that are themselves clean, i.e., not correlated with the error term. Furthermore, the list 
of instrumental variables should be at least as long as the X-list, i.e., include at least 
as many variables as there are in X.
Following these instructions, we checked empirically the list of explanatory 
variables to be included as instrumental variables (see equation (2)) for their appro-
priateness in this manner. Table A1 in the Appendix reveals the following findings: all 
of the explanatory variables (X) turned out to be “clean”, meaning that they have 
a negligibly low correlation with the error term (i.e., residuals). Thus, each of them 
(seven variables altogether) can be included in the list of instruments. Furthermore, 
additional variables have been chosen as (possible) instruments. These variables have 
an economic foundation in their relationship to the variable of small business, name-
ly: business investments are measured by their share in GDP (BINV) and are likely to 
increase the development of small business via new business and employment oppor-
tunities; R&D is the share of GDP devoted to research and development; and EDU
measures innovative ideas as measured by the percentage of the population aged 20 
to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education. They all contribute to 
the development  of  entrepreneurial  activities  in  an economy.  PART_E m easures 
the percentage of part-time workers in total employment, which can positively affect 
the small-business variable, as more free time can foster entrepreneurial ideas and 
provide opportunities to implement them, and IEF captures economic freedom, which 
needs to be ensured for proper small business development. BINV and R&D turned 
out to be particularly good indicators, as their correlation with the other variables in Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2                                          77 
X is of significant size, and they are also very poorly correlated to the error term (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix). The IV approach is therefore directly applied to the fol-
lowing equation:  
12 3 4 5 6
78
_ _. . .
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 (3) 
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The data used in this paper are taken from the ILO (2002), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Eurostat, the World Bank’s Doing 
Business, the Index of Economic Freedom, and Transparency International reports. 
We focus on the NMS-10 of the EU (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) during the six- 
-year period 2000–2005. We study the direct and indirect connection between the sha-
dow  economy  as  the dependent  variable  and  small  business  as  the explanatory 
variable. A panel data set is used and the pooled regressions are estimated. Due to 
the short time span it is less appropriate to apply the fixed or random effects model. 
By using the pooled regression we imply that the estimated coefficients are country- 
and time-invariant. The country-invariant assumption could have some foundation in 
that all the NMS-10 countries are former communist and recent emerging market 
economies that became EU members in 2004 or 2007. The time-invariant assump-
tion is justified by the short time span and the inclusion of main factors to (indirectly) 
affect the values of the estimated coefficients.  
4. Empirical Results 
Our final model, presented in equation (3), is empirically tested using the eco-
nometric software EViews. Taking into account the named instrumental variables, all 
the explanatory variables, and the proper rearrangements of the insignificant vari-
ables, we obtain the following results:  
First, the model as a whole has a relatively high explanatory power, with an ad-
justed R-square of 0.737, and is significant at P-value 0.000 with an F-statistic of 
33.85. In the process of obtaining the final model, we had to exclude the statistically 
insignificant variables, such as INFL, T-C, and T-L. The remaining variables included 
do not all have the anticipated sign of association with SE. GDP has a negative im-
pact, with a regression coefficient of -0.44, indicating that when GDP per capita in-
creases by one percentage point relative to the EU-27 average, the percentage of 
the shadow economy in GDP drops by 0.44 percentage point. Higher values of 
the Gini coefficient indicate more inequality and, as a result, an increasing size of 
the shadow economy: the GINI coefficient has a positive impact on SE, with a re-
gression coefficient of 0.40. On the other hand, the variable measuring corruption in 
the economy (TI), with a regression coefficient of 3.37, indicates that higher corrup-
tion leads (surprisingly) to a lower share of the estimated shadow economy in the eco-
nomy.  Also,  higher  unemployment  leads  to  a smaller  shadow  economy,  but  this 
might not be so suprising, since we use the strict ILO or Labor Force Survey de-
finition  of  the unemployment  rate,  under  which  all  those  working  in  the shadow 
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unemployed. The final variable in the model is the one we are studying more closely: 
S_EMPL. However, its effect on SE is very weak, indicating that when the percen-
tage of the self-employed in total employment increases by one  percentage point, 
the size of the shadow economy drops by a negligible 0.09 percentage points. Be-
sides, the effect is not statistically significant.  
Nevertheless, this empirical finding has important policy implications, indicat-
ing that in the studied period 2000–2005, i.e., the end of the transition period, the two 
studied variables act as reciprocals. The result suggests that there has been a successful 
(although weak) effort by the government and other policy makers to channel entre-
preneurial activities from the shadow economy into the official one. This means that 
policies should be focused on creating a favorable environment that supports entrepre-
neurial activities. This would simultaneously cause a decrease in the size of the shadow 
economy under low transaction, operational, institutional, and similar costs. 
5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
Small business, being flexible and thus able to cope with the ever-increasing 
pace of business nowadays, has seen a slight increase in the NMS-10 countries du-
ring their adjustments to EU membership. Recently, with the transition period ending, 
most of the major obstacles to its development, such as the tax burden, bureaucracy 
and its opportunity costs, and corruption, have been significantly decreased. Small 
business has developed in response to market niches and to the demanded flexibility 
and innovation, whereas the other phenomenon – the shadow economy – is seen as 
a response to constraints and obstacles blocking entrepreneurship in the official eco-
nomy. The shadow economy blossomed in the initial transition period prior to EU 
enlargement, mostly because of tax and bureaucracy issues. During recent years it 
has decreased somewhat, partly as a result of the economic growth in the NMS-10, 
TABLE 2  Estimation Results of the Model of the Shadow Economy (SE) for the Ten New 
Member States (NMS-10), 2000–2005 
Method  IV 
Dependent variable  SE
Coef.  Prob. 
Constant  35.072  0.000 
S_EMPL  -0.097  0.354 
GDP -0.446  0.000*** 
UNEMPL  -0.512  0.000*** 
GINI 0.405  0.002*** 




F-stat.  33.846 
Model summary 
Prob.   0.000 
Note: IV – instrumental variables, Prob. – significance level, Adj. R
2 – adjusted R square, F-stat. – F statistic 
for the model.  
SE  –  shadow  economy  as  the  percentage  of  GDP;  S_EMPL  –  share  of t he  self-employed  in  total 
employment; GDP – Gross Domestic Product; INFL – rate of inflation;  UNEMPL – unemployment rate; 
GINI – Gini coefficient of income distribution; T_C – taxes on capital; T_L – taxes on labor; and TI – 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.  
*** 1 percent level of significance; ** 5 percent level of significance Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2                                          79 
which have become more developed. Moreover, the rule of law and hard budget con-
straints are implemented more strictly.  
The early transition period saw an increase in both small business and the sha-
dow economy, but the most striking finding of our study is that this causality is not 
found to be significant in the period 2000–2005. This indicates that the main barriers 
to entrepreneurial ideas have been removed or at least lowered. In many NMS-10 
countries, small business, as measured as the share of the self-employed in total 
employment,  has  increased  and,  towards  the end  of  the period,  has  stabilized.  At 
the same time the shadow economy has mostly been successfully tackled. It has thus 
decreased in size somewhat, or has at least stopped growing significantly. This nega-
tive, yet rather weak association between the shadow economy as the dependent va-
riable and small business as the explanatory variable has been shown on the NMS-10 
in  the studied  period  2000–2005.  This  has an important  policy  implication:  policies 
encouraging small business development are not necessarily in collision with shrinkage 
of the shadow economy. This is consistent with governments’ efforts to channel entre-
preneurial  activities  from  the shadow  economy  into  the official  one.  Therefore,  en-
trepreneurial, tax, and other policies aimed at improving entrepreneurial incentives and 
decreasing  the barriers  to  entrepreneurship  reduce  the size  of  the shadow  economy. 
This line of reasoning holds for the effect of small business on the shadow economy, 
with the inclusion of other (control) explanatory variables for macroeconomic stability 
and performance, the legal and administrative framework, and social issues of income 
distribution. Government policies that encourage entrepreneurial activities and small 
business development (indirectly) reduce the shadow economy’s share in official GDP. 
The issues for future in-depth research of the phenomena inevitably include an analysis 
of a larger dataset to study the causes and consequences of the relationships between 
small businesses and the shadow economy, particularly in emerging market economies. 
APPENDIX
TABLE A1  Correlation Coefficients among Variables and Residuals from Equation (2) 
for the Ten New Member States (NMS-10), 2000–2005 
Variables  Residuals  BINV  EDU  IEF  PART_E  R&D 
S_EMPL  0.000  -0.643  -0.299  -0.671  0.332  -0.542 
GDP 0.000  0.406  0.732  0.352  -0.394  0.922 
INFL 0.000  -0.169  -0.276  -0.520  0.368  -0.267 
UNEMPL  0.000  -0.269  0.153  -0.087  -0.100  -0.523 
GINI 0.000  0.039  -0.431  0.394  0.590  -0.518 
T_C  0.000  -0.378  0.446  -0.363  -0.185  0.055 
T_L  0.000  0.297  0.489  0.349  -0.201  0.854 
TI 0.000  0.363  0.224  0.612  -0.206  0.633 
BINV  0.010           
EDU -0.223         
IEF  -0.287         
PART_E  0.263           
R&D 0.060           
Note: S_EMPL – share of the self-employed in total employment; GDP – Gross Domestic Product; INFL – rate 
of inflation; UNEMPL – unemployment rate; GINI – Gini coefficient of income distribution; T_C – taxes on 
capital; T_L – taxes on labor; TI – Transparency International Corruption Perception Index; BINV – Bu-
siness investments; EDU – share of 15-24 year-olds in tertiary education; IEF – Index of Economic Free-
dom; PART_E – share of part-time employment in total employment; and R&D – share of research and 
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